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PERSPECTIVAL SKEPTICAL THEISM
Jonathan Curtis Rutledge
Skeptical theists have paid insufficient attention to non-evidential com-
ponents of epistemic rationality. I address this lacuna by constructing an 
alternative perspectivalist understanding of epistemic rationality and defeat 
that, when applied to skeptical theism, yields a more demanding standard 
for reasonably affirming the crucial premise of the evidential argument from 
suffering. The resulting perspectival skeptical theism entails that someone can 
be justified in believing that gratuitous suffering exists only if they are not 
subject to closure-of-inquiry defeat; that is, a type of defeat that prevents rea-
sonable belief that p even if p is very probable on an agent’s evidence.
The strongest versions of the argument from suffering have been pri-
marily cast in an evidential form.1 That is, they have been crafted in such 
a way as to hinge on the mere weighing of evidence. Although this might 
appear innocuous at first glance,2 it is not as innocent as it seems. For the 
reasonability of believing a proposition (e.g., gratuitous suffering exists) 
plausibly depends on more than merely evidential matters. It also depends 
importantly on non-evidential, but still epistemic, factors that can vary 
significantly from agent to agent. Such factors include, for instance, an 
agent’s degree of epistemic self-trust or the degree of risk they are willing 
to take on in pursuit of the truth and avoidance of error.
This focus on merely evidential considerations has trickled down to the 
epistemic assumptions involved in responses to the argument from suffering 
as well. And nowhere is this more apparent than in the models of skeptical 
theism found in current literature. Given that skeptical theism aims to un-
dermine the reasonability of believing that there are gratuitous evils, and 
given further that one’s reasonability in believing something depends on 
more than merely evidential considerations, one would expect skeptical 
theism to (sometimes) take on more than a merely evidentialist3 form.
1See, for instance, Rowe, “The Evidential Argument from Evil” and Draper and Dougherty, 
“Explanation and the Problem of Evil.”
2After all, what’s not to like about arguing something by citing evidence?
3I use “evidentialist” broadly here to include those who think that fit with evidence is 
at least a necessary condition of rational/justified belief. By “merely evidentialist,” then, I 
refer to anyone who thinks non-evidential factors are irrelevant considerations in the par-
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In a previous article4 I provided the beginnings of a framework for 
developing just such a version of skeptical theism by suggesting that 
skeptical theism might be wedded to a perspectivalist account of epistemic 
rationality. However, this suggestion was made without much by way of 
further elaboration concerning what such a view might look like in full. It 
is the purpose of this essay to remove this lacuna by constructing a more 
robust account of a new perspectival skeptical theism, as well as to highlight 
the significant contributions such a view makes to the current literature on 
the argument from suffering.
I begin in § 1 by reintroducing the basic structure of the argument from 
suffering and skeptical theism as a response to it. Upon completing this, I 
briefly turn in § 2 to a distinction between two different types of epistemic 
undercutting defeaters, namely, evidential defeaters and closure-of-inquiry 
defeaters; the elaboration of this distinction is necessary for appreciating 
perspectival skeptical theism’s distinctiveness as a version of skeptical 
theism. Then in § 3 I turn to a case from the cognitive psychology literature 
involving empirical studies concerning the selection of applicants for ad-
mission to medical school. This case is particularly useful for our purposes 
because it clearly illustrates various ways in which a putative undercutting 
defeater—i.e., of either the evidential or closure-of-inquiry sort—might 
be rationally resolved by agents with different epistemic starting points. 
More specifically, I argue that we can uncover at least six different rational 
responses to an epistemic defeater provided by the claims of the empirical 
studies under question. Next, in § 4 we return once more to skeptical theism 
where I apply what we have learned from the previous two sections. What 
we again see is that for any agent entertaining the theses characteristic of 
skeptical theism, there are at least six different rational ways of resolving 
the putative defeaters such theses present. Finally, in § 5 I reflect on various 
advantages perspectival skeptical theism possesses over alternative forms 
of skeptical theism and conclude that it should play a significant part in 
conversations about the argument from suffering moving forward. Let us 
begin, then, with an overview of the argument from suffering.
1. The Argument from Suffering and Skeptical Theism
The best version of the argument from suffering of which I am aware 
proceeds in two parts, the first of which can be stated in the following 
deductive fashion5:
ticular case of the argument from suffering, such that in the context of that discussion, fit 
with evidence is necessary and sufficient for believing in the existence of gratuitous suffering. 
See Dougherty and Tweedt (“Religious Epistemology,” 552) where they discuss my use of 
“evidentialist” under the label of “Epistemic Evidentialism.” For a nice discussion of the 
various disputes amongst evidentialists concerning how best to construe their view, see the 
introduction to Dougherty, Evidentialism and Its Discontents.
4Rutledge, “Commonsense, Skeptical Theism, and Different Sorts of Closure of Inquiry 
Defeat.”
5There are other arguments from suffering to which skeptical theism (and variants of 
it) may not be straightforwardly relevant. The traditional logical argument does not make 
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1. If God exists, then there are no instances of gratuitous suffering.
2. There are instances of gratuitous suffering.
 Therefore,
3. God does not exist.
Now, someone might attack premise 1 for a variety of reasons,6 but this 
is neither the most common response nor the response most relevant to 
our current concerns. Instead, premise 2 bears the brunt of the critical re-
sponses historically-speaking since many theists find it difficult at best to 
believe that anyone could reasonably believe premise 2.
In support of the second premise, however, those advancing this ar-
gument from suffering might appeal to a principle of commonsense 
epistemology, such as:
Phenomenal Conservatism: If it seems to S that p, then S is prima facie 
justified in believing p.7
On the assumption that such a principle is true or rationally endorsed 
by someone advancing the argument from suffering detailed above, one 
could appeal to a combination of this epistemic principle and a particular 
seeming of some bit of suffering as gratuitous to arrive at a justified belief 
that there are instances of gratuitous suffering. And so long as there are 
no defeaters that prevent the immediate prima facie justified belief from 
becoming ultima facie justified, it will be reasonable for that person to af-
firm it.
It is at this point that skeptical theism becomes relevant, for skeptical 
theism is fundamentally at least an endorsement of the claim that there is 
a putative epistemic defeater for those who might otherwise reasonably 
believe premise 2 of the argument from suffering. That defeater can be 
stated as follows:
Skeptical Theism (ST): Human agents simply are not in a position to de-
termine how likely or unlikely it is that a given instance of apparently 
gratuitous evil is actually gratuitous.
To put it simply, skeptical theists affirm both ST and that someone who 
reasonably believes ST cannot reasonably endorse premise 2 of the evi-
dential argument from suffering. The reason for this is that ST undercuts 
the connection between the evidence one possesses of gratuitous suf-
use of the concept of gratuitous evil, but rather, evil simpliciter, and since skeptical theism is 
not relevant to non-gratuitous forms of evil, it is irrelevant as a response to the logical argu-
ment (cf. Mackie, “Evil and Omnipotence”). Plausibly, the Humean arguments developed by 
Draper are likewise immune to skeptical theist responses (though not obviously). For such 
an argument, see Draper and Dougherty, “Explanation and the Problem of Evil.”
6See, for instance, the approach taken in van Inwagen, The Problem of Evil.
7See Huemer, Skepticism and the Veil of Perception. This principle is also quoted in Rutledge, 
“Commonsense, Skeptical Theism, and Different Sorts of Closure of Inquiry Defeat,” 18.
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fering (i.e., one’s seemings) and what that evidence had been previously 
thought to support. Or at least, this follows provided that one’s seem-
ing-states as of gratuitous suffering are the only source of evidence for 
premise 2.
From this brief overview of the argument from suffering, however, 
it is clear that a completed version of skeptical theism requires further 
elaboration. For the idea of undercutting the connection between one’s ev-
idence and what it supports can be spelled out in a number of different 
ways. And since the goal of this paper is to construct a version of skeptical 
theism that relies on a perspectivalist theory of epistemic rationality, let 
us turn to a brief formal discussion of the two fundamental types of epis-
temic undercutting defeaters involved in such a view.
2. On Evidential and Closure-of-Inquiry Undercutting Defeaters
Undercutting defeaters come in at least two varieties, the first and more 
familiar of which are evidential defeaters. To understand the nature of 
evidential defeat, let e be one’s evidence concerning p whenever the prob-
ability of p given e is greater than the probability of p on one’s background 
evidence alone (i.e., Pr [  p|e] > Pr [  p]). Then we can say that dFull is a full 
defeater of the evidential support relation8 whenever the probability of 
p given e & dFull is equal to the probability of p alone (i.e., Pr [  p|e & dFull] 
= Pr [  p]). We can say that dPartial is a partial evidential support relation de-
feater whenever the probability of p given e & dPartial is greater than the 
probability of p alone but less than the probability of p given e—that is, 
the following both hold (on the assumption that e is evidence as construed 
above):
i. Pr [  p|e & dPartial] < Pr [  p|e]
ii. Pr [p|e & dPartial] > Pr [  p]9
The other sort of defeater sometimes introduced during discussions 
of perspectivalist forms of epistemic rationality is a closure-of-inquiry de-
feater, of which one would say the following:
8Let the “evidential support relation” simply name the relation that holds between e and 
p. That is, let it name the is-evidence-for relation. Notice that in the case of dPartial, e and p 
continue to instantiate the is-evidence-for relation, but the degree of evidential strength is 
diminished by the defeater. As I conceive of this, there is but one epistemic support relation 
that admits of degrees in the same way that a single relation of love might admit of degrees. 
Moreover, I restrict the discussion above to merely undercutting defeaters and leave the 
question of rebutting defeaters to one side. Rebutting defeaters of the evidential relation 
between e and p reduce the strength of the support relation by being evidence for ¬ p. How-
ever, undercutters undermine the relation between e and p without being evidence for the 
negation of p. See Pollock, Contemporary Theories of Knowledge and Pollock and Gillies, “Belief 
Revision and Epistemology.” Despite this, it is possible for a defeater to serve as both an 
undercutting defeater as well as a rebutting defeater at the same time. Thanks for an anony-
mous referee for bringing the importance of including these points to my attention.
9Rutledge, “Commonsense, Skeptical Theism, and Different Sorts of Closure of Inquiry 
Defeat,” 22.
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Such defeaters . . . do not affect the evidential support relation at all qua 
closure of inquiry defeater. Rather, they defeat the reasonability of believing 
some target proposition on the basis of one’s evidence, no matter how strong 
or compelling the evidence.10
Notice that on this account, closure-of-inquiry defeaters do not target 
the evidential support relation. Rather, they undermine reasonable belief 
in a proposition, even if the evidence is very compelling. In other words, 
we can say that whenever dCoI is merely a closure-of-inquiry defeater, the 
following will be true:
iii. Pr [  p|e & dCoI] = Pr [  p|e], and
iv. Even if Pr [  p|e] ≈ 1, p cannot be reasonably believed.
Before moving onto the question of why closure-of-inquiry defeaters 
undermine reasonable belief, as indicated in (iv) above, let me be explicit 
that one and the same proposition might give someone both a clo-
sure-of-inquiry defeater and an evidential defeater of some sort. In such a 
case, what is fundamental to the presence of a closure-of-inquiry defeater 
is that p cannot be reasonably believed on the basis of the evidence for 
p, whether or not the degree of evidential support remains unchanged.11 
Thus, (iii) above only holds for closure-of-inquiry defeaters that arise from 
a proposition that does not also give the agent in question an evidential 
defeater. When a proposition does give one an evidential defeater, then 
the truth or falsity of (iv) determines whether the agent under question 
also has a closure-of-inquiry defeater.
Now that we have distinguished these two types of defeaters, it is worth 
pressing further the question of why reasonable belief is undermined by 
closure-of-inquiry defeaters. There are at least two significant contexts 
worth attending to for our purposes from which closure-of-inquiry defeat 
might emerge: scenarios in which (i) further evidence gathering activities 
10Rutledge, “Commonsense, Skeptical Theism, and Different Sorts of Closure of Inquiry 
Defeat,” 24. The name “closure-of-inquiry defeater” might mislead someone into thinking 
that such defeaters themselves close off inquiry. This is mistaken, for such defeaters make 
closure of inquiry no longer reasonable. In other words, their presence opens up (or reopens) 
inquiry rather than closing it off. Thanks for an anonymous referee who suggested the need 
for clarification.
11Consider a case where one’s evidence for p is undermined sufficiently to bring the de-
gree of evidential support between e and p to a point at which closure of inquiry is also 
defeated. In this case, someone might wonder why we need to posit any defeater in addition 
to the evidential one since, presumably, the reason one can no longer close off inquiry is 
due to the evidential support falling below some threshold for reasonable belief. I have two 
responses to this. First, there are cases in which we have closure-of-inquiry defeaters without 
any evidential defeat, and so, it seems they cannot be merely reduced to each other. Second, 
if someone were unconvinced by the cases, then they likely have a view denying dualism 
about the epistemology of belief and the epistemology of degrees of belief. That is, they 
likely take either belief or degrees of belief to be fundamental in epistemology. See Jackson, 
“Belief and Credence,” where she discusses how belief-first, credence-first, and dualist posi-
tions make a significant difference to various areas of contemporary epistemology.
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seem likely to make a significant difference to what one’s evidence sup-
ports or (ii) one’s epistemic self-trust is called into question.12
Concerning the latter sort of closure-of-inquiry defeat that is most rel-
evant for our purposes, it is important to note the following: sometimes 
epistemic defeaters do not undermine the quality of one’s evidence, as 
normally happens in cases involving evidential undercutting defeat. 
Rather, often epistemic defeaters target our ability to assess that evidence, 
independently of whether or not it is of good quality. When our ability to 
assess evidence is targeted, rather than the quality of the evidence we have, 
then we find ourselves (potentially) in the possession of a closure-of-in-
quiry defeater.13
To understand better how these different considerations might play 
out, we turn to an actual case involving evidential and closure-of-inquiry 
defeaters and consider how such defeaters might interact for reasonable 
individuals confronted by them. This case is especially helpful for thinking 
practically about how the formal considerations above might look when 
put in a concrete context involving someone thinking seriously about 
what to do or think in light of the threat of an undercutting defeater. Once 
we have applied the evidential and closure-of-inquiry defeater distinction 
in this first case, we then turn to see how it might be similarly applied to 
the case of skeptical theism.
3. Interviewing Candidates for Medical School: Undermining the  
Quality of Evidence and the Reliable Assessment of Evidence
In recent years the relevance of certain sorts of heuristics and biases to a 
theory of rationality has attracted the attention of epistemologists.14 While 
there are a number of different cases that we could consider, the following 
scenario involving the interviewing of medical school candidates15 is es-
pecially illuminating:
12A discerning referee has drawn my attention to a combination of a particular theory of 
evidence and a theory of evidential support that would prevent closure-of-inquiry defeaters 
from being non-evidential, even if they are not clearly the same thing as a typical run-of-the-
mill undercutter. Suppose that one takes all evidence to be non-factive mental states (e.g., 
beliefs), a view which, following McCain, Evidentialism and Epistemic Justification, ch. 2, we 
call “psychologism.” Then suppose we understand evidential support in terms of something 
akin to proper function such that belief A supports B to a degree within the interval < x, y > if 
were S to believe A then S would believe B to a degree within the interval < x, y > (see Plant-
inga, Warrant and Proper Function, 167–168 for a way of defining the normative component 
of conditional epistemic probability along the lines I give here for epistemic support). On 
this combination of views, closure-of-inquiry defeat reduces to a form of evidential defeat. 
In this paper I presuppose a propositional account of the ontology of evidence, and on such 
a view, no such reduction occurs. See Williamson, Knowledge and Its Limits and Kvanvig, 
“Propositionalism and McCain’s Evidentialism” for defenses of the position I assume here.
13More on closure-of-inquiry defeaters can be found in Kvanvig, Rationality and Reflection, 
115–116 and Kvanvig, “Assertion, Knowledge, and Lotteries.”
14Cf. Kahneman, Thinking, Fast and Slow for examples of such phenomena.
15See Dawes, House of Cards for a discussion of these and other similar studies.
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In a wide range of studies, short personal interviews, typically one hour, 
have been proven unhelpful in improving the accuracy of predictions about 
the future accomplishments or behavior of the interviewees. One of the 
studies involves medical school admission committees that conducted per-
sonal interviews of applicants to supplement statistical and other imperson-
ally gathered data about the applicants (MCAT scores, grade point average, 
class rank, quality of undergraduate institution, etc.). The task for the com-
mittees was to predict future success in medical school as measured by the 
grades the students would receive. . . . The conclusion of these studies is that 
personal interviews do not improve predictions of future accomplishments 
or behavior. They did not help the interviewers identify who would become 
successful in medical school (as measured by grades). . . . Indeed, far from 
improving predictive performance, the interviews actually worsened the ac-
curacy of the predictions made.16
The findings of these studies is not favorable for the continued prac-
tice of interviewing potential medical school candidates. For clearly these 
interviews, when included in the assessment of an applicant, have in the 
past inhibited medical schools from achieving their goal of selecting the 
candidates who would be most successful.17 Now, suppose that you were 
required by your superior to conduct one-hour interviews for potential 
medical school students and that you learned of the studies described 
above only after conducting the interviews. Despite this, your supervisor 
has granted you permission to decide how to factor your intuitions con-
cerning each candidate’s potential into your overall assessment of them.18 
It is helpful when thinking about a noetic state undergoing this progres-
sion to represent it as constituted by three basic logical steps: (i) Defeater 
Admission, (ii) Determination of the Defeater-Type, and (iii) Defeater Res-
olution. We consider these three steps in logical sequence.
First, consider the two different defeaters to which the empirical studies 
concerning personal medical school interviews might give rise. In light of 
those studies, one might entertain either the proposition that the evidence 
one gains through personal interviews is of a bad quality or the proposition that 
one’s ability to gather and assess evidence gained through personal interviews is 
unreliable.19 Notice that both of these propositions would be undercutting 
16Foley, Intellectual Trust in Oneself and Others, 55–56.
17The actual goal of medical schools is, hopefully, much more complicated than what I’ve 
stated here. However, these complications are irrelevant to the example as I am employing 
it, so I ignore them throughout.
18Caveat: someone might think that significant self-monitoring might allow an inter-
viewer to reasonably continue to count her intuitions concerning candidates as evidence of 
future success. Foley (Intellectual Trust, 63–76) offers some helpful reflections on why this is 
unlikely. However, we can avoid a digression regarding the impossibility of self-monitoring 
by simply stipulating it in this case.
19Notice that here I have introduced a case where the two propositions that serve as un-
dercutting defeaters specify whether the difficulties with the evidence are in the evidence or 
in the assessment of the evidence. The proposition in question, however, may not be so spe-
cific. That higher-order proposition might, for instance, simply state that something about 
one’s first-order evidence is a problem (e.g., that there is a problem with using the evidence 
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defeaters if believed by an interviewer, but what is undermined by the two 
propositions is different. In the former case, the evidence is undermined be-
cause it is identified as plausibly misleading. In the latter case, one’s ability 
to gather and evaluate evidence is undermined, not the evidence itself.20 In 
other words, one is faced with either a putative evidential defeater or a 
putative closure-of-inquiry defeater (or perhaps even both).
The point of Defeater Admission comes as a result of the platitude that 
we shouldn’t believe everything we hear, and in particular, not every puta-
tive defeater one entertains need be believed. Whether or not I believe the 
propositional defeater under question depends on what else I believe, my 
epistemic risk profile,21 my degree of epistemic self-trust,22 what I make 
of the evidence I have received, and so on. To apply this to our current 
scenario concerning medical school candidate interviews, suppose that I 
have a justified belief that any empirical studies concerning my reliability 
in assessing the evidence gathered by means of personal interviews (or the 
quality of the evidence itself) are complete hogwash.23 We might call such 
a belief, following Plantinga,24 a “defeater-deflector.” Maintaining such a 
belief would, if I am consistent, preclude my also believing the putative 
defeaters of the empirical studies. Thus, before I even begin to consider 
the defeating potential of any putative defeater, that defeater must first 
avoid deflection by relevant beliefs I already possess.25
Let us suppose for the sake of continuing with this thought experiment 
that at least one of the putative defeaters has avoided deflection. Thus, the 
first logical step in the process of defeat has concluded and we begin the 
second step; namely, Determination of the Defeater-Type. At the beginning 
one has for believing the target proposition) without specifying whether the problem is one 
where the evidence is misleading or one’s ability to assess it is somehow compromised. In 
cases where an insufficiently specific proposition is in play, then the same proposition could 
give someone both an evidential defeater and a closure-of-inquiry defeater.
20And of course, after reflecting on these empirical studies we might come to think that 
both of these defeaters are true, in which case, both our reliability in gathering and assessing 
evidence and the evidence itself will be undermined.
21See, for instance, Riggs, “Balancing Our Epistemic Goals”; Riggs, “Epistemic Risk and 
Relativism”; and Kvanvig, Rationality and Reflection, chapter 5.
22For the best work on the notion and import of epistemic self-trust, see Foley, Intellectual 
Trust and Zagzebski, Epistemic Authority.
23Someone might worry about ever justifying such a belief, but since we’re dealing with 
a stipulated example, let us suppose that God has infallibly communicated this proposition 
to me.
24Plantinga, “Reply to Beilby’s Cohorts,” 223–225 and further discussion of defeater-de-
flectors in Moon, “Debunking Morality,” 210–212. The difference between a defeater-defeater 
and defeater-deflector is this: in the former case, there is a belief that has functioned as a 
defeater which is itself the object of defeat by some new belief. In the latter, defeater-deflector 
case, the proposition doing the deflecting prevents a defeater from arising in the first place.
25It is worth noting that even if I do have what could be a defeater-deflector, I might 
trust that deflector-belief less than I trust the putative defeater (perhaps due to the source of 
the defeater). Thus, the presence of beliefs that are structurally defeater-deflectors does not 
prevent defeat in every case. The point, however, is that sometimes such beliefs do prevent 
defeater admission, and sometimes they do so in accordance with reflective rationality.
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of this second step, then, we are in a position to determine whether the 
defeater or defeaters which we have admitted into our noetic system 
are either evidential defeaters (i.e., one which is either partial or full) or 
closure-of-inquiry defeaters. The way in which this step proceeds, how-
ever, is fairly complicated. In order to bring these complications to the 
surface, in what follows we survey the various combinations of defeat-
er-types along with their correlative Defeater-Resolutions (i.e., step 3).
We have already seen in our discussion of defeater-deflectors that 
other beliefs are relevant to the admission of a defeater into our noetic 
system. At this second step, in which we sort out the kind of defeater with 
which we are dealing, other epistemic factors again become relevant to 
what might happen. Let us consider five different ways in which rational 
reflection might play out for the medical school interviews case during 
this sorting phase.26 That is, let us consider what kind of reflection might 
lead an agent to admit either a closure-of-inquiry defeater, an evidential 
defeater, or both.
Recall that in our thought experiment, you have already interviewed 
potential medical school candidates, and thus, you have evidence con-
cerning who the best candidate is based on those interviews as its source. 
Moreover, prior to considering the implications of these empirical studies, 
let us stipulate that you had determined that Polly was probably the best 
medical school candidate. And now, when you hear these studies, you 
reason as follows:
Wow, it seems like these studies could call into question either the 
status of the evidence I have gathered from the interviews or my ability 
to assess that evidence (or both). However, when I reflect on this more 
carefully, I’m not sure why anyone would think that my evidence is 
problematic. After all, I simply gathered more information about each 
candidate in a particular setting. So my evidence doesn’t seem to be 
undermined. Despite this, given that I and all other members of my 
kind are highly fallible in tracking what this evidence actually connects 
to, perhaps I should keep my inquiry open until I can either gather more 
evidence that sufficiently confirms what I already take my current ev-
idence to imply or find a further reason to disregard the findings of 
these studies that are undermining the trust I have in myself to assess 
the evidence at hand.
This line of reasoning reflects the noetic system of a person dealing 
with a closure-of-inquiry defeater, for they do not change their assessment 
of the evidence they have gathered. Instead, they simply withhold belief 
in the proposition supported by their evidence until closure of inquiry 
reacquires rational status.
26Although, I should flag that in the end, we actually have six such cases because of the 
possibility that someone might not admit the putative defeaters into their noetic state to 
begin with.
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But there are other ways of sorting these putative defeaters. For in-
stance, an agent might take the studies to render the evidence gathered 
via personal interviews of medical school candidates as merely projective 
evidence. Such an individual would understand the empirical studies to 
show that in such interviews we see what we want to see rather than what is 
actually there. The appropriate response to such information is the same 
as the appropriate response to learning that the map one is following to 
Old Faithful in Yellowstone National Park is an outdated map with an 
incorrectly labeled location for Old Faithful. One would simply throw out 
the map in such a situation, and in the case of the interviews, one would 
simply throw out the evidence one has gathered about the candidates in 
the course of the interviews. And importantly, after one’s evidence has 
been fully undermined in this way, one need not reopen inquiry, but rather, 
once the change in evidential evaluations has taken place, inquiry can be 
closed. In other words, this describes someone who takes the empirical 
studies to provide a fully undercutting evidential defeater without also 
acquiring a defeater for closure of inquiry.
Yet suppose we have someone who similarly understands the evidence 
gathered via personal interviews to be in some important sense projec-
tive. However, suppose further that they think this is only partially the 
case. Some of the evidence they have gathered, let’s suppose, is not, to 
their lights, misleading. Such a person might then recalibrate the degree 
of strength accorded the evidence of personal interviews—perhaps only 
counting it to a slight degree—without disregarding the evidence in its 
entirety. In such a case, then, this person has acquired a partially undercut-
ting evidential defeater.
Might such a person also acquire a closure-of-inquiry defeater? Per-
haps. Whether or not they would acquire such a defeater, for instance, 
might depend on how epistemically cautious they are. Or rather, it might 
depend on the makeup of their epistemic risk profile. Consider the fol-
lowing case from Thomas Kelly that illustrates this point well:
Suppose that the evidence available to me is just barely sufficient to justi-
fy my belief that it will rain tomorrow: if the evidence was even slightly 
weaker than it is, then I would be unjustified in thinking that it will rain. 
Suppose further that you have the same evidence but are slightly more 
cautious than I am, and so do not yet believe that it will rain tomorrow. It is 
not that you are dogmatically averse to concluding that it will rain; indeed, 
we can suppose that if the evidence for rain gets even slightly stronger, 
then you too will take up the relevant belief. Is there some guarantee, given 
what has been said so far, that you are being less reasonable than I am?—I 
doubt it.27
In our case, take two individuals, Judah and Peri, who respond to the 
empirical studies by recalibrating the degree of strength they accord to the 
27Kelly, “Peer Disagreement and Higher-Order Evidence,” 120n9 (quoted in Kvanvig, 
Rationality and Reflection, 140, to illustrate a similar point concerning rationality).
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evidence of the interviews in precisely the same way. However, suppose 
that Judah is slightly more cautious than Peri, and as a result of recali-
brating his assessment of the evidence’s strength decides to reopen inquiry 
concerning the identity of the best medical school candidate. Peri, how-
ever, still finds the evidence sufficiently compelling after recalibration to 
conclude that Polly is the best candidate. In this instance, then, Peri has 
only acquired a partially undercutting evidential defeater while Judah has 
acquired in addition a defeater for closure of inquiry.
So, it is not too difficult to imagine how someone might reason-
ably acquire a partially undercutting evidential defeater alongside a 
closure-of-inquiry defeater. But might someone who has a fully under-
cutting evidential defeater also acquire a closure-of-inquiry defeater? 
This combination could be reasonable as well. Suppose that you acquire 
a fully undercutting evidential defeater as described earlier, but further 
suppose that you exhibit some doubt about your belief that the evidence 
gathered during the personal interviews was actually projective. Indeed, 
you think that the prospect of gathering more evidence about the empirical 
studies themselves might reasonably lead to a defeater-defeater. That is, you 
think further evidence gathering might provide evidence which would 
undermine the trustworthiness of the empirical studies and further cancel 
out the evidential defeater you have acquired from those studies. In such 
a case, learning of the studies undermines the evidence you have gath-
ered via personal interviews, but it also provides a reason to reopen an 
investigation concerning the best way to proceed in gathering evidence. 
Thus, it seems possible, though admittedly unlikely, that someone might 
rationally acquire both a fully undercutting evidential defeater and a clo-
sure-of-inquiry defeater on the basis of these interviews. This concludes 
our survey of the different rational reactions one might have to learning of 
the contents of these empirical studies.
What I have just done, then, is provide six different cases of individuals 
faced with putative evidential and closure-of-inquiry defeaters. Each case 
was described differently to illustrate how differences in one’s epistemic 
machinery (e.g., epistemic risk profile, degree of self-trust, etc.) make 
possible different rational reactions to the same putative defeaters. Those 
different reactions included (1) denying admission to either defeater full 
stop, or acquiring one of (2) a partially undercutting evidential defeater, (3) 
a fully undercutting evidential defeater, (4) a closure-of-inquiry defeater, 
(5) both a partially undercutting evidential defeater and a closure-of-in-
quiry defeater, or (6) both a fully undercutting evidential defeater and a 
closure-of-inquiry defeater.28
In the next section, we apply what we have learned to the question of 
skeptical theism. As becomes clear, changes to one’s theory of epistemic 
28Lest a reader object to this presentation of six options with a worry of the form, “What 
about option x?,”for the purposes of this essay I am not committing to any claim that the six 
options given are exhaustive of the possibilities.
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defeat, including but not limited to the addition of closure-of-inquiry de-
featers, have significant implications for the merits of skeptical theism as 
a response to the argument of evil. We shall see, in fact, that there is a 
plurality of reasonable responses to skeptical theism, all of which depend 
on the epistemic character of the agent assessing the evidence of suffering.
4. Perspectival Skeptical Theism:  
Rational Optionality and Epistemic Defeat in the Face of Evil
It is now time to apply the distinction between evidential and closure-of-in-
quiry defeaters, along with what we have gleaned from the various ways 
in which such defeaters might be resolved, to the case of skeptical theism 
and the argument from suffering. Recall the original statement of skep-
tical theism from § 1:
Skeptical Theism (ST): human agents simply are not in a position to de-
termine how likely or unlikely it is that a given instance of apparently 
gratuitous evil is actually gratuitous.
There are, it seems to me, two different putative defeaters that skeptical 
theism might generate for a given agent who is entertaining ST. This is due 
to the fact that there are two different ways to explain why human agents 
are unreliable in the way ST suggests. First, an agent might think that ST 
calls into question the quality of the evidence for gratuitous suffering of which 
she is in possession.29 Second, however, an agent might alternatively think 
that ST undermines her reliability in assessing the evidence she has. In other 
words, skeptical theism, like the earlier case involving the interviewing 
of medical school candidates, includes the potential for two different un-
dercutting defeaters: one aptly described as evidential and the other as 
closure-of-inquiry.
So, the case of ST parallels the medical school candidate interviews 
case, and the parallels are these: (a) both cases concern the gathering 
and assessment of evidence in a particular domain, and (b) both cases 
threaten either an evidential defeater (with, presumably, either partial 
or full defeating power) or a closure-of-inquiry defeater. Moreover, the 
variables involved in determining the possible rational responses to the 
putative defeaters involved in the medical school interviews case were 
not variables specific to that case. Rather, they were variables that could 
in principle apply to any parallel instance of epistemic defeat. But the case 
of ST is a parallel instance of such epistemic defeat. Thus, the six rational 
29It is worth keeping in mind that, with respect to our agent’s evidence gathering prac-
tices, she might not be doing anything epistemically wrong in gathering evidence. She might 
simply be stuck in a situation with respect to the evidence of gratuitous suffering analogous 
to the situation facing the denizens of evil demon worlds. That is, she might gather evidence 
perfectly well. The problem will merely lie in the fact that all the evidence she responsibly 
gathers is fundamentally misleading. That is, in such situations it is the evidence that is the 
problem rather than the agent.
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reactions to the putative defeaters found in the medical school interviews 
case should also be found in the case of ST.
What do we get when we consider the six different types of rational 
reactions involved in the case of ST? We again have the following possibil-
ities: (1) denying admission to ST as a defeater full stop or acquiring ST as 
one of the following—(2) a partially undercutting evidential defeater, (3) 
a fully undercutting evidential defeater, (4) a closure-of-inquiry defeater, 
(5) both a partially undercutting evidential defeater and a closure-of-in-
quiry defeater, or (6) both a fully undercutting evidential defeater and a 
closure-of-inquiry defeater.
Let us consider the upshot of this theory of defeat, then, for ST. Ac-
cording to option 1, it can be rational for someone to dismiss ST entirely. 
That is, in some cases, this employment of ST allows that someone can 
rationally endorse premise 2 of the argument from suffering after enter-
taining the possibility of ST (i.e., as in option 1). However, this employment 
of ST also allows that someone might be forced, on pain of irrationality, 
to entirely withdraw belief in premise 2 (i.e., as in options 3, 4, 5, and 
6). This is true of the final three options because of the presence of clo-
sure-of-inquiry defeat, which prohibits reasonable belief even in the face 
of very strong evidence. Furthermore, this is true in the case of option 3 
in virtue of the fact that one’s seemings as of gratuitous suffering are (or, at 
least, very likely are) the most significant source of evidence that there is 
gratuitous suffering. It follows from this that if that evidence is fully un-
dermined and we assume that no other source of such evidence is in play, 
then one will possess no evidence in favor of the existence of gratuitous 
suffering.30 Thus, it seems quite unlikely that someone finding themselves 
characterized by option 3 would be in an epistemically favorable position 
with respect to affirming that gratuitous suffering exists. When it comes to 
option 2, whether or not an agent remains on-balance justified in affirming 
that gratuitous suffering exists (i.e., after entertaining and resolving ST as 
a partially undercutting evidential defeater) depends on the degree of re-
calibration required by that agent’s noetic system and the other epistemic 
standards by which she can be represented (e.g., epistemic risk profile, 
epistemic self-trust, etc.). Such an agent might be rational in retaining a 
belief that gratuitous suffering exists (i.e., a belief in premise 2), but to 
know whether this is the case requires us to know more about that agent. 
In other words, mere knowledge of the propositions composing that 
agent’s evidence will be insufficient to further know whether that agent is 
justified in affirming that gratuitous suffering exists.
30Of course, one might, for instance, have a friend who is one’s epistemic superior and is 
also supremely trustworthy. Perhaps that friend also finds the evidential argument from evil 
compelling and provides testimonial evidence. In that case, the particular evidential support 
relation targeted by ST would not affect all the relevant evidence since some of the relevant 
evidence is testimonial (i.e., not gathered from attending to one’s seemings). I bracket out this 
and similar sources of evidence in subsequent discussion.
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5. Reflection on the Benefits of Perspectival Skeptical Theism
The preceding story concerning how the epistemic defeater(s) involved in 
ST might rationally play out partly constitutes what I have been calling 
perspectival skeptical theism. Endorsing such a view of epistemic ratio-
nality, however, is not itself sufficient to be a perspectival skeptical theist, 
for endorsing that view of defeat is compatible with also thinking that ST 
never serves as a defeater for anyone. It would indeed be an odd form 
of skeptical theism that denied ST defeated anything. Thus, in addition, 
perspectival skeptical theism affirms that when it comes to cases that are 
rightly characterized by the no defeat option (i.e., where the agent under 
consideration does not acquire a defeater when reflecting on ST), the 
agents involved likely suffer from a form of epistemic deficiency different 
from the egocentric rationality of particular concern to perspectivalists.31 
Perhaps such agents possess undue intellectual arrogance or perhaps they 
are motivated by something other than truth. The reason for the epistemic 
deficiency would vary from case to case, but the fundamental point of the 
perspectival skeptical theist would be that (i) there are multiple dimen-
sions of epistemic evaluation of which egocentric rationality is but one 
(though by no means an unimportant one), and (ii) in no-defeat cases of 
agents entertaining ST, rationality in a broader sense than the egocentric 
one has been undermined on some epistemically relevant basis.
Before concluding, it is worth briefly reflecting on why someone 
might be inclined to adopt perspectival skeptical theism over the more 
traditional variants of skeptical theism. Consider the following from 
a hypothetical objector. “So the idea of perspectival skeptical theism is 
that there is this special type of defeater, a closure-of-inquiry defeater, 
that someone might acquire for the proposition that there are gratuitous 
evils. Why might someone acquire this defeater? Well, they might do so 
in virtue of the sorts of considerations routinely given in support of ST 
(e.g., non-representativeness of evidence, analogical reasoning, etc.). In 
that case, then, what’s so remarkable about this special closure-of-inquiry 
defeater? The answer seems to be that closure-of-inquiry defeaters, once 
acquired, prevent an agent from reasonably believing the proposition in 
question even if the evidential support of that proposition has not been 
undercut by the defeater. Indeed, even if the degree of evidential support 
is very high between the agent’s evidence and target proposition, reason-
able belief is still undermined. If this is right (and it is), then here’s my 
worry: this is a strange version of ST because it seems to imply that the 
atheist wins the day. Evidential arguments from suffering typically only 
aim to establish that atheism is probable. But perspectival skeptical theism 
31I say “likely” since the conceptual space will remain, for a consistent perspectivalist, 
involving someone who scores well on all dimensions of epistemic rationality (i.e., they have 
a reasonable degree of intellectual virtue, are motivated by truth and not wish-fulfillment or 
something similar, etc.) but is in the unfortunate situation of just being wrong. Such a situ-
ation is analogous to an evil demon case where epistemic justification suffers a disconnect 
from alethic justification.
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seems to imply that even if ST is true, atheism may remain probable! As 
a result, closure-of-inquiry defeat seems to add little or no support to the 
skeptical theist’s aims.”32
There are several things to say in response to this objection. First, the last 
sentence of the objection presupposes that skeptical theists have some sort 
of common goal. Perhaps this type of objector assumes that all skeptical 
theists are theists (a reasonable mistake given the misleading name with 
which the position has been christened).33 If that were true, then perhaps 
the common goal of all skeptical theists could reasonably be identified as 
the apologetic task of defending theism against all possibility of attack. 
But this goal is not my goal. I am interested in the argument and a proper 
understanding of the mechanics of epistemic defeat involved when as-
sessing the argument from the first-person perspective. Thus, if the 
perspectivalist construal of epistemic defeat is correct and if the objector 
is right that perspectival skeptical theism allows atheism to win the day, 
then I am satisfied. For in that scenario, we have a better understanding 
of the argument as well as the proper place for ST (i.e., even if theism is 
undermined).
Even so, is it really correct to characterize someone in possession of a 
closure-of-inquiry defeater as “winning the day,” even if their evidence 
continues to support some target proposition (e.g., that there are gratu-
itous evils)? Perspectival skeptical theism contends that in addition to 
sufficient supporting evidence for a proposition, someone can “win the 
day” only if their evidence is not undermined by a closure-of-inquiry 
defeater which calls into question the reliability of that evidence or the 
agent’s evaluation of the evidence. To say that someone in this situation 
has “won the day” seems odd, to say the least. Witness the following sorts 
of bizarre conclusions as parodies of this sort of objection:
Pink elephants probably exist. I see them everywhere! Granted, I took 
a hallucinogen this morning, so my evidence is probably systemically 
misleading. Nevertheless, I am glad to know my argument from I see 
a bunch of pink elephants to the claim that they probably exist is sup-
ported by my evidence.
Polly is probably the best medical school candidate. After all, she 
nailed the personal interview! Now, I know that those empirical studies 
strongly undermine the reliability of my intuitions based on that in-
terview, so I won’t conclude that Polly is the best candidate. In fact, 
it would be an epistemic mistake. That is, it would be unreasonable. 
Nevertheless, I am glad to know that she is probably the best candidate 
based on my (probably unreliable) evidence.
32I owe this objection to an anonymous referee. Indeed, I have met this objection inde-
pendently on a number of occasions, which is why I am addressing it in the main text. 
33The unfortunate-naming observation of skeptical theism has been made by others. See, 
for instance, Daniel Howard-Snyder, “Epistemic Humility, Arguments from Evil, and Moral 
Skepticism,” 17–18.
259PERSPECTIVAL SKEPTICAL THEISM
Is Alex guilty of murder? Well, all the evidence seems to point that way, 
so he’s probably guilty. Of course, Alex’s defense attorney made a pretty 
strong case that Alex had been framed, in which case the evidence 
strongly supports his guilt in a fundamentally misleading way. But at 
least we know he’s guilty on the basis of this potentially misleading 
evidence. Perhaps that’s all we on the jury should care about.
Suppose that the above examples characterize the epistemic situation 
of someone assessing the merit of the argument from suffering. If so, then 
I contend that they have further work to do. For the fact that atheism is 
probable on their evidence doesn’t seem significant enough to render 
“winning the day” an apt description of them. Or to put it another way, 
“winning the day” is an apt description of them only if it is also an apt 
description of the three agents described in the three above examples. Un-
fortunately for the objector, it’s clearly not.
Having set aside the above objection, then, are there any positive rea-
sons for endorsing perspectival skeptical theism? That is, does it have any 
significant advantages over other forms of ST?
Indeed, there are several advantages. First, philosophers residing on 
both sides of the theistic/atheistic divide understand the strong inclination 
to believe both of the following propositions; namely, (i) that events like 
the Holocaust very strongly seem to include gratuitous suffering and (ii) 
human agents are not reliably able to track all the possible goods, evils, and 
entailment relations between them, the tracking of which is needed to de-
termine whether an evil is gratuitous.34 Any account of rationality should, 
I think, be able to explain the intuitive pull of these propositions while 
also allowing that an agent might reject one or the other intuition without 
giving up their claim to rationality. That is, a strong intuition in support of 
epistemic permissivism35 characterizes this debate, and perspectival skep-
tical theism provides the epistemic foundations for preserving it.
Second, although perspectival skeptical theism allows that someone 
might be reflectively rational in dismissing ST as a defeater in its entirety—
and thereby leaves the argument from suffering rationally compelling for 
at least some possible agents—it also makes affirming the argument from 
suffering more difficult. Many philosophers either explicitly or implicitly 
betray a tendency to assume that the weighing of evidence is all that fun-
damentally matters when assessing the argument from suffering,36 but the 
perspectival skeptical theist points out that often other epistemic factors 
34This is akin to the construal of skeptical theism found in Michael Bergmann’s version 
of skeptical theism. See, for instance, Bergmann, “Commonsense Sceptical Theism,” 11–12.
35For an excellent and brief recent discussion of permissivism, see Kelly, “Evidence Can 
Be Permissive.”
36See for instance, Matheson, “Phenomenal Conservatism and Skeptical Theism”; 
Dougherty, “Phenomenal Conservatism, Skeptical Theism, and Probabilistic Reasoning”; 
Wykstra, “The Humean Obstacle to Evidential Arguments from Suffering,” 148; van 
Inwagen, “The Problem of Evil, the Problem of Air, and the Problem of Silence,” 163, 171; 
and Bergmann, “Commonsense Scepticism Theism,” 23–24.
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are relevant (e.g., epistemic risk profiles, degrees of epistemic self-trust, 
etc.) to an assessment of the argument. It follows from these considerations 
that even if one determines that the evidence in one’s possession strongly 
confirms that gratuitous suffering exists, one may yet remain unable to 
reasonably believe the proposition confirmed by one’s evidence. That is, 
until one has gathered sufficient evidence and garnered a sufficient degree 
of epistemic self-trust to render closure of inquiry appropriate,37 belief that 
there are gratuitous evils will remain rationally inappropriate.
Third, ST has in various places been saddled with concerns that em-
ploying skepticism as a response to the argument from suffering precludes 
the further employment of defenses or theodicies in response to the same 
argument. Because it includes the possibility of closure-of-inquiry defeat, 
however, perspectival skeptical theism offers an interesting way out of 
these concerns.38
Suppose that someone, Sandy, acquires a closure-of-inquiry defeater 
in virtue of having a particular degree of epistemic risk aversion. That is, 
suppose that Sandy, as a matter of policy when considering subjects insuf-
ficiently relevant to everyday life, refuses to affirm a proposition unless 
she assigns a credence of at least .95 to the proposition. Let the proposition 
in question be there are gratuitous evils. Prior to considering theodical argu-
ments, Sandy assigns a credence of .96 to there are gratuitous evils. Because 
of her policy of affirming propositions with a credence of at least .95, she 
affirms there are gratuitous evils. Suppose she then considers the free-will 
defense for the first time, and it seems to her that the probability of there 
are gratuitous evils given her assessment of the free-will defense becomes 
.94. As a result of considering the free-will defense, the credence she as-
signs to the proposition that there are gratuitous evils has fallen below the 
egocentrically-determined threshold for reasonable belief. As a result, she 
acquires a closure-of-inquiry defeater for the reliability of her evidence 
that there are gratuitous evils in a way that is perfectly consistent with 
considering the impact of defenses and theodicies on the evidence of suf-
fering in her possession.39
There are other measures by which a philosophical position might be 
evaluated. Accordingly, I do not intend to claim that the three advantages 
cited above decisively favor perspectival skeptical theism over its more 
traditional rivals. Nevertheless, the advantages cited—i.e., its fit with epis-
temic permissivism, additional requirements for endorsing the argument 
37Rutledge, “Commonsense, Skeptical Theism, and Different Sorts of Closure of Inquiry 
Defeat,” 25–30. 
38See also Michael Murray, Nature Red in Tooth and Claw, 37–40 for a way of thinking about 
how traditional forms of ST might allow for considering the merits of theodicies or defenses.
39Similar points could be made to explain how the employment of natural theology might 
be compatible with perspectivalist forms of ST. See, for instance, Wilks, who articulates the 
worry that ST and natural theology do not fit well together: “The [skeptical theist] rationale 
that discounts the problem of evil should be applied with equal force to any form of the de-
sign argument which appeals to the presence of goods” (“The Global Skepticism Objection 
to Skeptical Theism,” 460).
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from suffering, and compatibility with assessing the strength of various 
theodicies—offer a significant change to the thrust of the debate and can 
refocus the discussion of skeptical theism on epistemic foundations which 
too often go critically unexamined.
Conclusion
In this article, I constructed a new form of skeptical theism, perspectival 
skeptical theism, modeled as a combination of a standard skeptical the-
ist’s thesis, ST, with a perspectivalist form of epistemic rationality and 
defeat. After distinguishing between evidential and closure-of-inquiry 
defeaters, I considered how such defeaters might differently interact with 
epistemically varied agents. I identified six possible rational outcomes 
of agents faced with putative epistemic undercutting defeat spawning 
from the results of a study conducted on the trustworthiness of medical 
school interviews as sources of evidence for the best future medical school 
students. Next, I showed how the defeaters emerging from the medical 
school case could be seen as parallel to the defeaters involved in an agent’s 
entertaining of ST. By drawing out the parallels, I arrived at a description 
of perspectival skeptical theism and briefly reflected on its advantages 
over alternative interpretations of the epistemic implications of ST. Those 
advantages, though not alone decisive, demonstrate that perspectival 
skeptical theism both holds much promise as a way of progressing the 
quality of debate surrounding the argument from suffering and deserves 
more attention moving forward.40
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